Russia tests its new ‘doomsday weapon’: How dangerous is the ‘Burevestnik’?

Just a day after the United States and Russia failed to reach an agreement on the Donetsk issue, diplomatic talks gave way to displays of military power and new sanctions. On October 21, Russia conducted a highly publicized missile test in the Novaya Zemlya region, located between the Arctic Ocean, the Barents Sea, and the Kara Sea. The missile, reportedly capable of carrying nuclear warheads and flying unlimited distances, is known by several names: the Russians call it “Burevestnik,” while Europeans refer to it as “Skyfall.” Both mean nearly the same—something akin to “storm bird” or “rainstorm.” But today’s story isn’t about Adele’s famous song “Skyfall,” but about a weapon of the same name that is gaining global attention as a potential doomsday device.

What kind of weapon is it?

Official information about the October 21 “Burevestnik” missile test was revealed on October 26. President Vladimir Putin, dressed in military uniform, ordered Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov to deploy the weapon to designated locations. According to Gerasimov, the missile successfully stayed airborne for 15 hours and covered 14,000 kilometers—enough to reach New York or Washington from almost anywhere in Russia. Putin claimed the “Burevestnik” could fly an unlimited distance and was “impossible to intercept” by any existing air defense systems.

However, experts doubt the missile’s performance is as limitless as Putin suggests. Open-source data paints a less impressive picture. According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, the “Burevestnik” has had a poor testing record in recent years, with only two partial successes out of thirteen tests. Even worse, in 2019 an explosion during a test at a naval base near the White Sea killed five nuclear engineers and two military personnel. While Russian officials have since reported “successful” tests, these claims remain difficult to verify.

Reports of the missile first appeared in 2018, but only in October 2023 did Moscow announce a successful test. If another success occurred in 2025, that would mean only two successful launches in total—hardly the record of a fully reliable weapon. Despite the Kremlin’s enthusiasm, whether the “Burevestnik” truly matches Putin’s claims remains uncertain.

Is the “Burevestnik” truly dangerous?

In 2024, two American researchers suggested that the missile might be stationed near Vologda-20 or Chebsara, known sites for nuclear warhead storage about 475 kilometers north of Moscow. Its nuclear propulsion system allows it to fly much farther than conventional jet- or turbofan-powered missiles, enabling it to remain in flight for days. The Nuclear Threat Initiative has stated that the “Burevestnik” could theoretically stay airborne for several days. In 2019, the organization also reported that the missile might carry multiple nuclear warheads, fly at low altitudes around the globe, evade missile defense systems, and strike unpredictable targets.

Some Western experts argue that its slow speed makes it easier to detect and that the longer it remains in flight, the weaker it becomes. In response, Russian military analyst Alexei Leonkov claimed the “Burevestnik” could “send aggressor nations back to the Stone Age” by destroying their military and civilian infrastructure. The International Institute for Strategic Studies estimated in 2021 that the missile’s range could reach up to 20,000 kilometers and that it could fly as low as 50 to 100 meters—too low for most radar systems to detect.

A widening rift between Putin and Trump

The missile test, along with new sanctions targeting two major Russian oil companies, further strained relations between the Kremlin and the White House. A growing divide has emerged between the administrations of Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin. Adding to this tension, the Russian president signed a law annulling the U.S.–Russia plutonium disposal agreement. The State Duma had approved the measure on October 8, and after the Federation Council endorsed it on October 22, Putin finalized it on October 27.

The agreement, signed in 2000 and ratified in 2011, committed both countries to disposing of 34 tons of weapons-grade plutonium each after reducing their nuclear arsenals. Putin had already suspended the deal in 2016, citing U.S. sanctions against Russia, support for Ukraine, NATO’s eastward expansion, increased U.S. military presence in Eastern Europe, and Washington’s attempts to alter plutonium disposal terms without Moscow’s consent.

Russia set several conditions for reinstating the deal—conditions that resembled an ultimatum. Moscow demanded that the U.S. reduce its military infrastructure in NATO member states that joined after September 1, 2000, repeal the 2012 “Magnitsky Act” and the 2014 “Ukraine Freedom Support Act,” lift all sanctions against Russia, and compensate for economic damages. Beyond geopolitics, the plutonium issue itself remains crucial. Plutonium poses not only military but also environmental risks, as contamination from the element can lead to respiratory and cardiovascular diseases. It also damages forests, rivers, and ecosystems, while imposing high economic costs related to health care and productivity loss.

Despite uranium being the primary material for nuclear power, plutonium is often preferred for its higher energy density—it produces more energy with less material, making it economically attractive. It is also better suited for fast reactors, which are more efficient and generate less nuclear waste than conventional ones. Still, plutonium is highly radioactive, difficult to handle safely, and can be used to produce nuclear weapons, raising concerns about proliferation. Thus, while its advantages are significant, so are the dangers it brings.

Meanwhile, former U.S. President Donald Trump, who was touring Asia, sharply criticized Putin’s actions, urging him to pursue peace instead of missile tests. During a flight from Malaysia to Japan on October 27, Trump told reporters that in response to the “Burevestnik” test, the U.S. had already deployed “the best nuclear submarine in the world” near Russian shores.

“They’re not playing games with us, and we’re not playing games with them,” Trump said. “We regularly conduct missile tests, but as I’ve said, we have a nuclear submarine. I don’t think what Putin said makes sense. He should be ending the war that was supposed to last a week but has been going on for four years. That’s what he should be doing, not testing missiles.”

Kirill Dmitriev, Russia’s special envoy and head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund, said he personally provided American officials with information about the “Burevestnik” tests.

However, U.S. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent dismissed him as a “Russian propagandist,” telling CBS News host Margaret Brennan that it was “irresponsible” to air Dmitriev’s comments since “he has nothing else to say.”

Trump’s criticisms, Putin’s nuclear rhetoric, and Bessent’s blunt remarks toward a senior Russian envoy all suggest that U.S.–Russia relations are once again entering a period of deep confrontation. After months of gradual improvement, bilateral ties appear to have reverted to their old, hostile state. Throughout this time, one thing has become clear: while Trump’s administration initially treated Putin and Russian officials more amicably than previous U.S. governments, the Kremlin used this goodwill to buy time and intensify its war in Ukraine. In the end, patience within the MAGA camp seems to have run out—and Bessent’s statement made that frustration unmistakably clear.